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Abstract. We propose a large universe attribute-based encryption (ABE ) scheme from lattices. It 
is inspired by Brent Waters’s scheme which is a large universe attribute-based encryption using 
bilinear map. It is a very practical scheme but this scheme may not be security with the developing 
quantum computer. So we extend their good idea of large universe attribute-based encryption to 
lattices based cryptosystem. And our scheme is the first large universe ABE scheme from lattices. 
In a large universe ABE system any string can be used as attribute and attributes need not be 
determined at system setup. This is a desirable feature. And the master private key of our scheme 
is too short too a matrix. Moreover, our scheme is high efficient due to the ciphertext of our 
scheme is divided into three parts. Finally, under Learning with Errors (LWE) assumption, we 
prove our scheme is secure under the select attribute attack. 
 
Key words：Large Universe; Lattices; Attribute-Based Encryption; Short key; Efficiency; 
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1. Introduction 
The notion of Fuzzy Identity Based Encryption was first introduced by Sahai and Waters [1] at 
EUROCRYPT'05, which is the foundation of the emergence of attribute-based encryption (ABE) 
system. Attribute-Based Encryption has occupied a huge area of research in cryptography over the 
last few years. The emergence of Attribute-based encryption system makes the decryptor a group 
with the same properties instead of a single individual. Attribute-based encryption system makes 
the ciphertext can be shared by multi-user, so it improves access efficiency of the system. The 
most prominent advantage of the system is very applicable to the situations which not need to 
know the specific receiver, and the receiver who only satisfies the corresponding conditions can 
decrypt the message from sender. This makes the attribute-based encryption system be widely 
used. 
The study of attribute based encryption schemes has already obtained many research results. 
Especially in recent years Waters et al. [2] made a great improvement of attribute-based 
encryption schemes in the aspect of practical, the most representative is proposed a scheme which 
supports large universe attribute encryption. In large universe attribute encryption the size of 
attribute universe can be exponentially large. This is a desirable feature compared the small 
universe attribute encryption which fixed attributes at system setup. But it is a pity all this 
practical scheme is based on bilinear pairing technology with the decisional bilinear 
Diffie-Hellman assumption or the variant decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption, such as 
literature [2], [3], [4]. But the main drawback of this type of scheme is generally inefficient, 
because the program is generally necessary to calculate multiple bilinear pairs. So people try to 
construct the attribute based cryptosystem using other techniques. 
In recent years, many breakthroughs have been made in lattice to design cryptosystem, which 
mainly reflected in the construction of public key cryptosystems relies on lattice hardness 
problems. Cryptography scheme based on lattice theory has many advantages, such as high 
efficiency, simple structure which easy to understand. Moreover, the most important advantage is 
lattice-based schemes enjoying strong security guarantees. There is an intrinsic relation between 
the attribute based cryptosystem and fuzzy identity based cryptosystem, and there already have 
some literatures [5],[6],[7]designed several encryption schemes based on attribute from lattice. 
Although attribute based scheme on lattice has a little productive. 
Our motivation: Combined with advantages and disadvantages of ABE from bilinear and the 
advantages and disadvantages of ABE from lattices, we hope to build a large universe ABE from 
lattices. 
First of all, since Waters et al [2] propose a practical large universe ABE scheme recently which 
is a very practical scheme but the security of this scheme is threatened since the emergence of a 
quantum computer. So we hope to extend his good idea of large universe attribute-based 
encryption to lattices based cryptosystem.  
Second, due to large universe ABE dose not determine the number of attributes in system setup, 
but we hope determine the master private key at once. This may avoid the flaws of modified the 
master private key after addition extra attributes later.  
Finally, since in large universe ABE scheme, the number of attributes participates in the 
encryption may too large, so we hope message encryption can divide into different parts. Some 
parts have nothing to do with the number of attributes participate in the encryption, only one part 
related. Therefore, we can achieve efficient encryption 
Our Contributions: 
 Our main result is the scheme of a large universe attribute-based encryption from lattices, and 
reduces its security from LWE. 
 First, our scheme is the first large universe ABE from lattices. We apply new idea access 
policy  ,M  on LSSS which propose in Brent Waters’s [2] scheme “Practical Constructions and 
New Proof Methods for Large Universe Attribute-Based Encryption” in 2013 to attribute-based 
encryption from lattices. And the main idea of this scheme is change the LSSS  access policy 
from one matrix form to a matrix and a   ql Z map  form. In previous LSSS  access 
policy, every row of the share-generating matrix M is just map to an attribute.  While in large 
universe ABE, map  in access policy can map every row of the share-generating matrix M to 
any attributes on universe. Through use the new access policy  ,M  on lattices we get a large 
universe attribute-based encryption form lattices.  
Second, our scheme has a short master key. The master private key of our scheme has only one 
matrix
0A
T , which is a short base of public parameter 0A . And the public key 
0 ||i i E A A B of every attribute is combined with two parts, the first part is the same public 
parameter 0A , and the second part is i A B which is determinant by every different attributes. 
So we hide our trapdoor 
0A
T  information just under the first part. Then the master private key is 
fixed no matter how many attributes have in our system. But the fault is that the size of ciphertext 
and the time of encryption will increase two times, since it is linear to the number of columns 
in iE . 
   Third, our scheme is efficient. In order to overcome the shortcoming above, we divide the 
ciphertext into three parts. And we not use public key iE  in encryption algorithm directly but 
divided iE into two parts. So our ciphertext combine with three parts: the first part is message 
encryption, the second part is general encryption and the third part is attributes encryption, where 
the size of first and second is fixed that is irrelevant to the attributes participant encryption. The 
first part is only related to the message msg , the second general encryption part just related to the 
first part of public key 0A , and the third part is encrypt by the second part iA  of public key. So 
will not repeat save and calculation the common part of first part 0A of public key. This allows 
the master private key into a matrix, but the size of the ciphertext and the encrypted time add not 
too much. 
Finally, under LWE assumption, our scheme is security under the select attribute attack. 
Organization：The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we define our notion and 
recall some preliminaries. In section 3 we describe our construction. The Correctness and Security 
of our construction are given in section 4. Finally, we conclude in section 5. 
2. Preliminaries 
We first introduce the notion used throughout the paper, and then introduce the basic knowledge 
of lattice, some theorems on lattice. Finally we give the security assumptions used in our scheme. 
2.1 Notation 
Throughout this paper, we use uppercase boldface alphabet for matrices, as in A ; lowercase 
boldface characters for vectors, as in e , and lowercase regular characters for scalars, as in v ,  l  
be the set  l,,2,1  . Denoted 2l norm by  . For 
n mR X and n mR Y , 
   || n m mR  X Y denotes the concatenation of the column of X  followed by the columns 
of Y . Similarly, for n mR X  and n mR Y ,    ; n n mR  X Y is the concatenation of the 
rows of X  followed by the rows of Y . 
2.2 Random Integer Lattices 
Definition1. Let   mnm R  bbB 1 be a mn  matrix whose columns are linearly 
independent vectors 
n
m Rbb ,,1  .The ldimensiona-m  generated by B is infinite 
periodic set, 
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Here, we are interested in integer lattices, i.e. infinite periodic subsets of
mZ . 
Definition2. For q  and mnqZ
A and nqZu , define: 
    qtsZ mq mod0..  AeeA  
    qtsZ mq mod.. uAeeAu   
2.3 Trapdoors for Lattices: The algorithm TrapGen 
Ajtai [8] showed how to sample an essentially uniform matrix
mn
qZ
A with an associated 
rank-full  set  ATA
  of low-norm vectors. We will use an improved version of Ajtai’s 
basis sampling algorithm due to Alwen and Peikert [9]: 
Definition3 ([9]). Let       mmqqnn  ,,  be positive integers with 2q  
and qnm log5 . There exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm TrapGen that outputs 
a pair
mn
qZ
A , mnqZ
AT such that A  is statistically close to uniform and AT  is a basis for 
 A  with length  mmL log~  AT  with all but  1n  probability. 
2.4 Discrete Gaussians 
Definition4. Let 0 Zm be a positive integer and 
mR an m-dimensional lattice. For any 
vector 
mRc  and any positive parameter oR  , we define: 
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For notional convenience, 0,  and 0,,D  are abbreviated as   and ,D . 
2.5 Gaussians Sampling algorithms over Lattices  
The following Gaussians Sampling algorithms over lattices are used in basic construction and 
security proof. 
2.5.1 SampleLeft algorithms 
SampleLeft algorithms [10]: let 2q  , m n . There is an algorithm 
 SampleLeft , , , ,T sAA B u  takes a full rank matrix
n m
qZ
A , a matrix 1n mqZ
B , a 
basisTA of  
u
q A  , a Gaussian parameter   1logs T m m  A  and a vector 
u as input, output a vector 1m mqZ
e distributed statistically close to 
 ,q s
D
u F
,where 
 : ||F A B .  
2.5.2 Preimage Sampling 
We will use following algorithm from [11]. Let 2q , qnm log2 . 
 ,,,SamplePreAlgorithm uTA A
[11]: On input a matrix 
mn
qZ
A with ‘short’ trapdoor basis 
AT for  A
q , a target image 
n
qZu  and a Gaussian parameter  mlog~   AT , outputs 
a sample 
mZe  from a distribution that is within negligible statistical distance   ,Auq
D

. 
2.5.3 Lattice basis extension algorithm   
ExtBasis [12]: There is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm  AAAS ||, ExtBasis  
with following properties: given an arbitrary matrix 
mn
qZ
A whose columns generate group nqZ , 
an arbitrary basis 
mmZ S of  A  and let mnqZ
A be arbitrary. 
 AAAS ||, ExtBasis  Outputs a basis S of   mmZ   A such that SS ~~  . 
Moreover, the statement holds even if the columns of A  are permuted arbitrarily ( AA || denote 
the concatenation of matrix A and A )           
2.6 Access Structures and Linear Secret-Sharing Schemes 
In this section, we present the formal definition of access structures and linear secret-sharing 
scheme, adapted to match our setting. 
Definition 5 (Access Structures) [13]. Let U be the attributes universe. An access structure on 
U is a collection A  of non-empty sets of attributes, i.e.  2 \UA . The sets in A are called 
the authorized sets and the sets not in A  are called the unauthorized sets. 
  Additionally, an access structure is called monotone if ,B C U  : if B A and B C , 
then C A . 
  In our constructions, we only consider monotone access structures, which mean that a user 
acquires more attributes; he will not lose his possible decryption privileges. 
Definition 6 (Linear Secret-Sharing Schemes (LSSS)) [13]. Let q be a prime and U the attributes 
universe. A secret-sharing scheme with domain of secrets qZ realizing access structures on 
U is linear over qZ if 
1. The shares of a secret qs Z for each attribute form a vector over qZ . 
2. For each access structure A  on U , there exists a matrix l nqM Z
 ,called the 
share-generating matrix, and a function  , that labels the rows of M  with attributes from 
U , i.e.  : l U  , which satisfy the following: During the generation of shares, we 
consider the column vector  2, ,
T
ns r rv  , where 
$
2 , n qr r Z . Then the vector of 
l  shares of the secret s  according to   is equal to lqM Zv . The share   jMv  where 
 j l  “belong” to attribute  j . 
    We will be referring to the pair  ,M   as the policy of the access structure A . 
    According to [13], each secret-sharing scheme should satisfy the reconstruction requirement 
for the authorized sets and any unauthorized set cannot reveal any partial information about the 
secret. In our setting, let S denote an authorized set for the access structure A  encoded by the 
policy  ,M  . Then let I  be the set of rows whose labels are in S , i.e. 
    |I i i l i S    . The reconstruction requirement asserts that the vector  1,0, ,0 is 
in the span of rows of M  indexed by I . This means that there exist constants  i i Iw  such that 
for any valid shares   i i i IM  v of a secret s  according to , it is true that i ii I w s  . 
Additionally, it has been proved in [13] that the constants  i i Iw   can be found in time 
polynomial in the size of the share-generating matrix M  
2.7 Hardness Assumption 
The LWE (learning with errors) problem was first defined by Oded Regev [14] in 2005, and has 
since been extensively studied and used. We use the decisional version of the LWE  problem. 
Definition7. Consider a prime q , a positive integer n , and a distribution qZ , all public. An 
  LWEnZq ,, problem instance consists of access to an unspecified challenge oracle O , 
being, either, a noisy pseudo-random sampler xO  carrying some constant random secret key 
n
qZx , or, a truly sampler $O ,whose behaviors are respectively as follows: 
xO : Output noisy pseudo-random samples of the form     qnqiTiiii ZZwwvw  x,, , 
where，
n
qZx  is a uniformly distributed persistent secret key that is invariant across invocations. 
i is a freshly generated ephemeral additive noise component with distribute  , and
n
qi Zw  is a 
fresh uniformly distributed vector revealed as part of the output. 
$O : Output truly random samples   q
n
qii ZZvw , , drawn in independently uniformly at 
random in the entire domain q
n
q ZZ  . 
The   LWEnZq ,, problem statement, or LWE for short, allows an unspecified number of 
queries to be make to the challenge oracleO , with no stated or prior bound. We say that an 
algorithm A  decides the   LWEnZq ,, problem if    1Pr1Pr $  OO AA x is 
non-negligible for a random
n
qZx . 
It has been shown in [14] that there is a   timeqnpoly ,  reduction from 
Search   LWEnZq ,, to decision   LWEnZq ,, . 
The confidence in the hardness of the LWE problem stems in part of a result of Regev[14] 
which shows that the for certain noise distributions  , the LWE problem is as hard as the 
worst-case SIVP and GapSVP under a quantum reduction .A classical reduction with related 
parameters was later obtained by Peikert[5]. 
Proposition ([14], Theorem1).Consider a real parameter    1,0 n and a prime 
  nnqq 2 .Denote by ZRT   the group of reals  1,0 with addition modulo 1. 
Denote by a the distribution over T of a normal variable with mean 0 and standard deviation 
n2 then reduced modulo 1. Denote by   




2
1
xx the nearest integer to the real Rx . 
Denote by  the discrete distribution over qZ of the random variable   qqX mod  where the 
random variable TX  has distribution a . 
Then if there exists an efficient, possibly quantum, algorithm for deciding the 
  LWEnZq ,, problem, there exists a quantum  npolyq  -time algorithm for 
approximating the SIVP and GapSVP problem, to within  nO
~
factors in the 2l  norm, in the 
worst case. 
Since the best known algorithms for k2 -approximations of gapSVP and SIVP run in time 
 
k
nO
~
2 [7], it follows from the above that the LWE problem with the noise ratio

 n 2 is likely 
hard for some constant 1 .  
Next two lemmas will need to show that decryption works correctly. 
Lemma 9 [15]. For any n-dimension lattice , vector nRc , and real      s,1,0 , we have  
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The lemma sates that for large enough s , almost the elements chosen from c,,sD are close to c . 
Lemma 10[16]. Let e  be some vector in mZ  and let
m
y . Then the quantity ye
 treated as 
an integer in  1,0 q satisfies 
 
2
log mmqe eey    
With all but negligible probability in m. In particularly, if x is treated as an integer in 
 1,0 q  then  
2
1log  mqx   with all but negligible probability in m. 
3. A Large Universe Attribute-Based Encryption Scheme from 
Lattices 
Our scheme is inspired by large universe ABE on bilinear and ciphertext policy ABE from 
lattices proposed in [2] and [7] respectively. And combine them we achieve our scheme large 
universe ABE from lattices. The concrete construction consists of the following four PPT 
algorithms: 
 . 1Setup  . Takes the security parameter and a description of attributes universe qU Z  as 
input, and outputs the public parameters pp and the master private key msk . Where prime 
 2q   . 
1. Use algorithm  1TrapGen  to select a uniformly random mn  matrix 0
n m
qZ

A with 
full-rank m -vector base 
0
m m
qT Z
A  such that  0qT

0A
A  and  
0
logAT m m 
 ; 
2. Select a matrix mnqZB
  randomly;  
3. For each attributes i U , select matrix n mi qZ
A  randomly; 
4. Select a uniform random l -vector   lql
T Zsss  ,, 21s ; 
5. Return the public parameter   0 , , ,i i Upp  A B A s and the master private key 
0A
msk  T . 
  , , , .KeyGen pp msk M   On input the public parameter pp , the master private key 
0A
msk  T and an access policy  ,M  , where l nqM Z
 ,  : ql Z  , output the private 
key sk . 
1. Select vector 1 2, ,
n
l qZy y y such 
that      1 1 12 13 1 2 2 22 2 2, , , ; , , , ; , , ,
T TT
n n l l l lns y y y s y y s y y  y y y    ,where 
ql Zsss ,, 21 is the corresponding components of  
l
ql
T Zsss  ,, 21s , and ,i j qy Z is 
choose randomly for 1, ; 1,2, ,i l j n   ; 
2. Let       1 2, ,
T
i i i
i lM   y  , .,1 li   
3. Use SampleLeft algorithm get the private key of attributes  i , for .,1 li   let 
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i λ and    0 ||i i  E A A B , then call the 
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  0SamplLefte , , , jii A A B λ get    2 1j mqi Z e , i.e. 
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Where  (log ) logm m T m     
0A
 , then according to the 
 
  0Algorithm SamplLefte , , , jii A A B λ we know  (j) ie from a distribution which close 
to the distribution  
 ,
j
i
q i
D

 A
. So we know m(j)i e with overwhelming probability.  
4. Obtain the private key    
 
 
 
 
  1 2, , ,i i ii lsk    e e e  of attributes  i , and set the private 
key    
 
 
 
 
  1 2, , ,i i ii lsk    e e e to the entity who has the attributes  i  under access 
policy  ,M   through secure channel. 
Note ： Under a access policy  ,M  , the decrypt key of an attributes list S is 
      S, , i isk M sk 
   
 
. 
 , ,Encrypt pp S msg : On input the public parameter pp , an attributes set pS U Z  and a 
plaintext  0,1msg , output ciphertext ct . 
1. Choose a uniformly random n-vector
n
qZx . 
2. Constructs a n  dimension vector f , just expands l dimension vector 
  lql
T Zsss  ,, 21s in the public parameter pp to n  dimension. 
Set , ; 0,i i if s i l f l i n     ; 
3. Select a low-norm Gaussian noise scalar qZ0  according to some parametric distribution 
 , and select a low-norm Gaussian noise vector χ ，
2m
i qZχ  from  
m
  for every i S ; 
And compute: 
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2
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T m
qC Z   x A χ  
  2T mi i i qC B Z
   x A χ  
Then output the ciphertext   0, , , i i Sct S C C C  . 
 , ,Decrypt pp sk ct : On input the public parameter pp , the private key sk about an attributes 
set and a ciphertext ct . Output the message msg . 
First the decryption algorithm calculates the set of rows in M that provide a share to attributes 
in S , i.e.   :I i i S  . Then it computes the constants  i q i IZ  such 
that  1,0, 0i ii I M   , where iM is i-th row of the matrix M . These constants exist if the 
set S is an authorized set of the policy (see [13]). 
Then it calculates    
 
0
1
;
l
j
i i ii I
j
r C C C 

  e , If
4
q
r  , output 0, else output 1.  
4. Correctness and Security  
4.1 Correctness 
In this subsection, we show that our construction is correct with some appropriate parameters 
setting. 
Theorem 11 if we select the appropriate parameter, the Attribute-Based Encryption Scheme from 
Lattices in the previous section will be decryption successfully with overwhelming probability. 
Proof If the decryptor can calculate  1,0, 0i ii I M   , and know the private 
key       S, , i isk M sk 
   
 
, then decrypted by the calculation: 
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Where      1 2 3、 、 we use the 
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4.2Security  
In this subsection, we prove our scheme’s security in the standard model under above 
parameters setting. 
Theorem 12 If there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A with advantage 0  in a 
selective-security attribute list attack against the above scheme, Then there exists a probabilistic 
polynomial-time algorithm B that decides the   LWEnZ q ,, problem with advantage  , 
where   npolyO . 
Proof. In the LWE problem, the decision algorithm is given access to a sampling oracle, O , 
which is either a pseudo-random xO with embedded secret 
n
qZx  , or a truly random sampler 
$O (see definition 7), Our decide algorithm B will simulate an attack environment for, and exploit 
the prowess of A, to decide which oracle it is given. The reduction proceeds as follows. 
Target. A announces a target attribute set  * 1 2Attrib , Attrib , AttribtS U  , on which it 
wishes to be challenged.  
Setup. Challenger B get target attribute set from adversary A. 
1. B draws  , ns q qv Z Z s ,  0 0,
n m n
q qZ Z
 A v from O . And 
compute    , TrapGen , ,n m qBB T .  
2. For each attribute
*i S , B draws  , n m ni i q qZ Z
 A v  from O , and set i i A A B in 
the public parameter; 
3. For each attribute
*i S , challenger B draws  , n m ni i q qZ Z
 A v  from O , and set 
i iA A in the public parameter; 
Finally, challenger B set the public parameter   0 , , ,i i Upp  A B A s and keep 
  0, , ,s i i Umsk v  BT v v as secret. 
Key generation Queries1. Now the challenger B has to produce a private key about the access 
policy  ,M  , but for this access policy  ,M  , the target attribute 
set  * 1 2Attrib , Attrib , AttribtS U  is a not authorized set. Here we describe the process 
that the challenger B how to construct a private key about  ,M  as follow 
(where
l n
qM Z
 ,  : ql Z  ): 
1. Since 
*S is not authorized for  ,M  , there exists an attribute   *S   for all  l   at 
least. Without loss of generality, we suppose   *1 S  . By setup algorithm know, the 
challenger B know the trapdoor BT of B . Then the challenger B can calculate the trapdoor 
 1E
T of     01 1||  E A A B  through algorithm ExtBasis . 
2. The according the algorithm 
        1 1 2, || || || lExtBasis E E   ET E E  output the 
trapdoor ET of E . Then the challenger B use trapdoor ET  to get private key  ksk of 
attribute    ,k k l   through calling the algorithm 
 SamplePre , , ,j EE T s (where
1
0,0 ,0, ,0, 0j j
j n j
s
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Challenge. When adversary A submits  0 1, 0,1msg msg  , challenger B randomly 
chooses  0,1b , and computes the ciphertext about attributes set *S  : 
0 0
2
b q
q
C v msg Z
 
    
 
0
m
qC Z  v  
* *,mi i qC Z i S  v  
And return ciphertext   ** *0 , , i i SC C  C C  
Key generation Queries2. B answers queries of A the same way it does in key generation 
queries1 with the only restriction that the target attributes 
*S is not authorized for  ,M  queries.  
Guess. After the query 2, adversary A output a bit b as a guess for b .If b b ，B outputs 1, 
else outputs 0.  
4.3 Parameter 
Because our scheme refer some classical algorithms and consider the correct and security of our 
scheme, we want the set the parameter appropriately. 
1. Use TrapGen  (see section 2.3 TrapGen ) in setup, and the algorithm need qnm log5 ; 
2. Use SamplLefte (See section 2.5.5) in key generation, and need Gaussian parameter 
 
0
log 2m  AT ; 
3. For the hardness of LWE (see Proposition 8) assumption, and need mq 2 ; 
4. For the SamplePre (see section 2.5.2) used in key generation queries of security proof, and 
need  log lm  ET . 
For the correctness of our scheme we need    0
1 5
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restriction about parameter above, we set the parameter in our scheme as follows: 
Note that according to the TrapGen algorithm we know  
0
, logO n qA ET T
  , and 
then we calculate    0
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So we set the parameter such that     2log 2 1 1 2
5
q
q m l m     and satisfy four 
restrictions above, our scheme will be success with overwhelming probability.  
Assume that   is a real such that qnn log1  , and set  ,,,, qmn  as follow: 
1. Take n  such that qnn log1   appropriate;  
2. Set qnnm log55.1  , satisfying 1 above; 
3.  loglm lm   , satisfying 2 and 4 above; 
4. The noise parameter     
1
21 log 2 1 1 2
5
m l m  

    satisfying 3 above; 
5. Set large prime q as     210 2 log 2 1 1 2q m m l m    , satisfying the 
inequation. 
For this setting, it is not only satisfying the condition algorithm we used but also can decrypt 
ciphertext correctly with overwhelming probability.  
5．Conclusions 
In this paper, we present a large universe attribute-based encryption from lattices, and the size 
of the attribute sets can be exponentially large, and we can add attributes after the system setup. 
The scheme only uses a matrix as the master private key, it makes the master private key’s storage 
cost is too small; moreover, the ciphertext divide into three parts in the encryption process, and to 
do so both reduce the size of the ciphertext and shorten the time encryption; Finally, 
under LWE assumption, our scheme is security under the select attribute attack. 
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